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Football and the Infield Fly Rule
Howard M. Wasserman
AbstRAct
In a previous article, I defended baseball’s infield fly rule, the special rule long 
beloved by legal scholars, in terms of equitable balance in distribution of costs 
and benefits between competing teams. This Essay applies those cost-benefit and 
equity insights to football. It explores several plays from recent Super Bowls, 
the cost-benefit balance on those plays, and the appropriate role in football for 
limiting rules similar to the infield fly rule.
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INTRODUCTION 
Legal scholars have long loved the infield fly rule, the often-mysterious 
baseball rule that, in certain situations, makes a batter out even if an infielder fails 
to catch an easily catchable fly ball.1  This is a subspecies of the broader academic 
fascination with baseball.2  In The Economics of the Infield Fly Rule, I defended the 
rule as part of baseball’s structure and logic, justified by concerns for an equitable 
balance and distribution of costs and benefits between competing sides on indi-
vidual plays.3 
While baseball still calls itself the national pastime, professional football 
long ago surpassed it in popularity, with college football now close behind.4  Yet 
the academic fascination has not transferred to football as a game, as opposed to 
as a powerful institution at the center of important legal controversies.5  And no 
one has yet explored the rules of football in search of a counterpart to the infield 
fly rule.  Rather, the supposed absence of anything akin to the infield fly rule in 
football is an arrow in the quiver against that rule in baseball.  Critics argue that 
if football does not have or need something akin to the infield fly rule, then 
baseball does not need it either. 
While no football rule enjoys the infield fly rule’s pedigree or intellectual cult 
following, football is filled with game situations and corresponding rules cut from 
its intellectual and logical cloth, seeking similarly equitable cost-benefit distribu-
  
1. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, OFFICIAL BASEBALL Rule 2.00 (2013) (Infield Fly); Howard M. 
Wasserman, The Economics of the Infield Fly Rule, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 479, 491. 
2. E.g., BASEBALL AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL MIND ix–x, 3 (Spencer Weber Waller et al. eds., 
1995); ROGER I. ABRAMS, LEGAL BASES: BASEBALL AND THE LAW 3 (1998); A. BARTLETT 
GIAMATTI, TAKE TIME FOR PARADISE: AMERICANS AND THEIR GAMES (1989); Neil B. 
Cohen & Spencer Weber Waller, Taking Pop-ups Seriously: The Jurisprudence of the Infield Fly Rule, 
82 WASH. U. L.Q. 453, 454 (2004); Aside, The Common Law Origins of the Infield Fly Rule, 123 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1474 (1975). 
3. Wasserman, supra note 1, at 493. 
4. Football Continues to Be America’s Favorite Sport; the Gap With Baseball Narrows Slightly This Year, 
HARRIS INTERACTIVE (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/NewsRoom/Harris 
Polls/tabid/447/ctl/ReadCustom%20Default/mid/1508/ArticleId/1136/Default.aspx. 
5. Cf. Michael A. McCann, American Needle v. NFL: An Opportunity to Reshape Sports Law, 119 
YALE L.J. 726 (2010) (discussing antitrust implications of league licensing deals); Howard M. 
Wasserman, Introduction: Football at the Crossroads, 8 FIU L. REV. 1 (2012) (introducing a 
symposium on head trauma in football); Kerri L. Stone, Why Does It Take a Richie Incognito for Us to 
Start Talking About Bullying?, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 16, 2013, 12:35 PM), http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/kerri-l-stone/post_6167_b_4276891.html (discussing new public awareness 
of workplace bullying following report of bullying in National Football League (NFL) locker 
rooms). 
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tion.  Having just marked another Super Bowl Sunday6 as an unofficial national 
holiday,7 it is a good time to consider football as a source of game situations in 
which special rules are necessary to ensure equitable cost-benefit exchanges.  Co-
incidentally and beneficially, two recent Super Bowls8 and several regular season 
games from the just-completed 2013 regular season have featured plays illustrat-
ing how and when cost-benefit imbalances arise in football and how the game’s 
rulemakers respond.  And taking advantage of this journal’s online format, I 
have embedded video and photos of these critical plays as part of the Essay. 
I. LIMITING RULES  
In my recent contribution to infield fly rule scholarship, I introduced the 
concept of limiting rules, defined as unique, situation specific rules that override 
ordinary rules, practices, and strategies in particular game situations.  I further ex-
plained that such rules are necessary when the cost-benefit exchange on a play 
shifts inequitably in favor of one side and against the other.9 
A limiting rule is warranted when a game situation is defined by all of four 
features.  First, the play in question produces an overwhelming, unfair, and ineq-
uitable cost-benefit disparity, in which one side gains substantial benefits while 
incurring no, or virtually meaningless, costs and the opposing side incurs substan-
tial costs while obtaining no, or virtually meaningless, benefits.  Second, the play 
involves a disparity in control—the advantaged side is free to manipulate the situ-
ation to its benefit, while the disadvantaged side is helpless to stop or counter that 
manipulation within the game’s regular rules and practices.  Third, the advan-
taged side achieves these disparate benefits by intentionally failing or declining to 
perform the athletic skills they are expected to perform under the game’s ordinary 
practices and strategies.  And fourth, the opportunity to gain that overwhelming 
  
6. Super Bowl XLVIII was played on February 2, 2014—the day before this essay was published.  It 
was played outdoors in New Jersey, the first cold-weather outdoor Super Bowl.  Jim Litke, Super 
Bowl: Cold Weather, Cold Cash, PHILLY.COM (Dec. 27, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.philly. 
com/philly/news/local/20131226_Super_Bowl__Cold_weather__cold_cash.html. 
7. Michael Jay Friedman, Super Bowl Sunday an Unofficial Holiday for Millions, IIP DIGITAL (Feb. 1, 
2012), http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/article/2006/02/20060202162836jmnamdeirf0.5 
559656.html#axzz2paVNWI2i.  
8. In Super Bowl XLVI, played in February 2012, the New York Giants defeated the New England 
Patriots 21–17.  Nick Meyer, Super Bowl XLVI Results: Giants Defeat Patriots in Final Minutes, 
YAHOO! SPORTS (Feb. 5, 2012), http://sports.yahoo.com/nfl/news?slug=ycn-10930532.  In 
Super Bowl XLVII, played in February 2013, the Baltimore Ravens defeated the San Francisco 
49ers 34–31.  Super Bowl XLVII New Orleans, NFL, http://www.nfl.com/superbowl/47 (last 
visited Jan. 6, 2014). 
9. Wasserman, supra note 1, at 486. 
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cost-benefit advantage incentivizes the advantaged side to intentionally fail or de-
cline to perform those expected athletic skills whenever the situation arises.10 
The consequent limiting rule imposes the outcome that would result on the 
play if the advantaged team had acted consistent with ordinary expectations by 
performing the game’s ordinary athletic skills in the expected manner.  By impos-
ing that outcome, the limiting rule removes the opportunity and incentive for 
players to act contrary to expectations or to fail, or decline, to perform expected 
athletic skills in search of extraordinarily greater benefits.11  The infield fly rule—
which declares the batter out even if the fielder fails to catch an easily catchable fly 
ball12—is the paradigm of a limiting rule.13 
Importantly, this framework recognizes that sports often involve cost-
benefit tradeoffs.  Teams readily accept suboptimal outcomes on individual plays; 
each gains some benefits, surrenders some benefits to the opponent, and incurs 
some costs, each hoping to come out ahead on the exchange.  When that cost-
benefit exchange is relatively fair and equitable, limiting rules are unnecessary.  
Rather, the situation can and should be left to the game’s ordinary rules, practices, 
and strategies.  Only when the cost-benefit imbalance is significantly disparate 
and inequitable and too weighted toward one side and against the other does a 
limiting rule become necessary.14 
Nor is this framework limited to sports.  I previously analogized the rules of 
sport to the rules of procedure, as both establish the framework and structure in 
which disputes, whether athletic or judicial, are contested and resolved.15  Both 
sports rules and procedural rules are designed to ensure a level playing field, with 
rulemakers occasionally tweaking the background rules to maintain that level 
field.16  When holes in the existing framework, whether of a sport or litigation, 
produce extreme cost-benefit disparities, limiting rules restore a more optimal 
balance.17 
Rulemakers must continually study the game, identifying situations in 
which the cost-benefit disparity becomes too inequitable and a limiting rule is 
appropriate to restore a proper balance.  Often it takes only a single play.  What 
became the infield fly rule was enacted in 1894 in direct response to a single play 
  
10. Id. at. 486–89. 
11. Id. at 489. 
12. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, OFFICIAL BASEBALL Rule 2.00 (2013) (Infield Fly). 
13. Wasserman, supra note 1, at 493–97. 
14. Id. at 489–90. 
15. Id. at 484. 
16. Id. at 485–86. 
17. Id. at 487. 
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in an 1893 game.18  In the National Football League (NFL), the task of studying 
the game and recommending rule changes falls to the Competition Committee, a 
nine-person committee of coaches, owners, and front-office personnel.19  Con-
tinuing the analogy to procedural rules, the Competition Committee is akin to the 
various committees and subcommittees that continually study how the federal rules 
of practice and procedure are functioning and recommend changes, often to restore 
necessary cost-benefit balance.20  And just as the rules committees propose some 
changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in response to specific decisions of 
the Supreme Court of the United States,21 the NFL’s Competition Committee is 
most likely to respond to problematic plays occurring in the Super Bowl. 
II. FOOTBALL AND LIMITING RULES 
This definitional framework, created to explain baseball and its rules, has 
explanatory value for many sports, including football.  The framework can be 
used to identify game situations in which the cost-benefit disparity is so imbal-
anced and outsized as to warrant a limiting rule grounded in the same logic as the 
infield fly rule, as well as those situations that reflect equitable cost-benefit ex-
changes not warranting limiting rules. 
In applying this framework to football, two preliminary points are in order. 
First, unlike baseball, football is timed.  The goal in baseball is simple: score 
the most runs possible and get the necessary outs, twenty-seven in the ordinary 
nine-inning game, to end the game.  The offensive team thus typically wants to 
maximize the runs it scores and minimize the outs it surrenders.22 
  
18. Id. at 491–92. 
19. Four Coaches Named to Coaches Subcommittee of Competition Committee, NFL COMM. (Apr. 15, 2013), 
http://nflcommunications.com/2013/04/15/four-coaches-named-to-coaches-subcommittee-of-
competition-committee-2. 
20. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2073(a), (b) (2012); Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: 
Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099 (2002). 
21. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 15 advisory committee’s note to 1991 amendment (revising Rule 15(c)(3) 
to overturn result of Supreme Court decision in Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21 (1986)); see also 
Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil Procedure Revival, 31 REV. LITIG. 313, 
332, 346 (2012) (describing proposals and arguments aimed at overturning the Supreme Court’s 
recent pleading decisions). 
22. A batting team only rarely has an incentive not to try to score runs.  For example, a Major League 
game becomes a regulation game after five innings have been completed, four-and-a-half innings if 
the home team is leading.  Thus, a team leading as rain threatens may forgo trying to score 
additional runs in favor of trying to end its turn at bat quickly to ensure that enough innings are 
completed to make a regulation game.  See MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, OFFICIAL BASEBALL 
Rules 4.10(a), (c) (2013). 
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The goal in football is not necessarily to score as many points as possible but 
simply to score more points than the opponent when time expires.  Thus, in de-
termining when a team is acting consistently with the game’s rules and strategies 
and performing the expected athletic skills, we must consider not only the goal of 
scoring points but also the goals of having time run off the clock and denying the 
opponent an opportunity to score.  For example, a football team leading late in 
the game and in possession of the ball may run plays not necessarily designed or 
intended to lead to a score or even to gain yards, but only to keep the clock run-
ning—the clock continues running between plays unless the ball goes out of 
bounds or a thrown pass is incomplete23—and to maintain possession of the ball, 
thus denying the opponent possession and the opportunity to score.  
Second, strategy over the course of a football game emphasizes field position 
in addition to points.  This encourages strategy in which one team surrenders 
possession of the ball—and thus the opportunity to score points—in exchange for 
putting the opponent in a less advantageous position on the field.  For example, 
teams often punt the ball away on fourth down from near midfield, despite statis-
tical studies suggesting it is better to try to gain the short yards for a new set of 
downs.24  The prevailing view among coaches, however, is that it is better to have 
the opponent gain possession deeper in its own territory, with further to travel for 
a score, than near midfield if the fourth-down play fails. 
Both moves—playing to run time off the clock and playing for advanta-
geous field position—reflect expected skills and strategy within the game’s basic 
framework.  One team incurs the cost of failing to gain yardage on a play while 
enjoying the benefit of having time lapse off the clock.  Or one team incurs the 
cost of surrendering possession in exchange for the benefit of better field position, 
while the other team gains the benefit of possession and a chance to score against 
the cost of starting from a less advantageous place on the field.  How these ex-
changes play out—and which team ultimately gains the most—depends on sub-
sequent events. 
With these caveats about football in mind, we can examine several game sit-
uations—drawn from two recent Super Bowls and the most recent regular sea-
  
23. NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, OFFICIAL PLAYING RULES OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL 
LEAGUE Rule 4-4 (2013). 
24. See Brian Burke, The 4th Down Study – Part 4, ADVANCED NFL STATS (Sept. 16, 2009), 
http://www.advancednflstats.com/2009/09/4th-down-study-part-4.html; Brian Burke, The 4th 
Down Study – Part 3, ADVANCED NFL STATS (Sept. 16, 2009), http://www.advanced 
nflstats.com/2009/09/4th-down-study-part-3.html; Brian Burke, The 4th Down Study – Part 2, 
ADVANCED NFL STATS (Sept. 15, 2009), http://www.advancednflstats.com/2009/09/4th-
down-study-part-2.html; Brian Burke, The 4th Down Study – Part 1, ADVANCED NFL STATS 
(Sept. 15, 2009), http://www. advancednflstats.com/2009/09/4th-down-study-part-1.html. 
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son—to illustrate how prevalent limiting rules are or might be in football and 
how those limiting rules function. 
A. Intentional Penalties 
1. Running Time Through Penalties 
In Super Bowl XLVI, played in 2012, the New York Giants led the New 
England Patriots 21–17 with seventeen seconds remaining in the game.  The Pa-
triots had the ball at their own forty-four yard line, needing a touchdown to win 
the game.  The Patriots ran a play that resulted in an incomplete pass, running 
eight seconds off the clock.  But the Giants were called for having too many play-
ers on the field.  The incomplete pass became a nonplay and the ball advanced five 
yards to the Patriots’ forty-nine yard line.  But those eight seconds remained off 
the clock.  Thus, while the Patriots were five yards closer to the winning touch-
down, only nine seconds remained in the game.  They were able to run only one 




25. See Eli Manning, Giants Thwart Pats Again to Cap Magical Run With 4th Super Bowl Title, ESPN 
NFL, http://scores.espn.go.com/nfl/recap?gameId=320205017 (last visited Dec. 24, 2013). 
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Although there was no indication that the Giants intentionally placed 
twelve players on the field26—and Figure 1 seems to show the twelfth man run-
ning toward the sideline to get off the field rather than trying to be involved in the 
play—one could see the wisdom of that strategy.  Leading by more than three 
points, such that the opponent must score a touchdown to tie or win, and with 
the opponent far from the end zone in the waning seconds of the game, a team 
will gladly surrender five yards in exchange for running half the remaining time 
off the clock.  In fact, one former NFL defensive coach designed a play for this 
very situation, shown in Figure 2.  The play intentionally places as many as three 
extra defenders on the field, making it more likely the defense would stop what-
ever play the offense ran, while willingly accepting the penalty in exchange for 
time running off the clock.27 
 




26. Barry Petchesky, Did the Giants Put 12 Men on the Field on Purpose for Brady’s First Hail Mary?, 
SLATE (Feb. 6, 2012, 1:36 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/sports/sports_nut/features/2011/ 
nfl_2011/super_bowl/giants_patriots_super_bowl_did_new_york_put_12_men_on_the_field_on
_purpose_for_brady_s_first_hail_mary_.html. 
27. See Dom Cosentino, Buddy Ryan’s “Polish Goal Line” Defense Was Against the Rules, and That Was 
the Point, DEADSPIN (Oct. 19, 2011, 4:55 PM), http://deadspin.com/5851460/buddy-ryans-
polish-goal-line-defense-was-against-the-rules-and-that-was-the-point. 
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An intentional penalty in this game situation reflects all four of the features 
triggering a limiting rule. 
First, the play produces a significant cost-benefit disparity in favor of the de-
fending team holding a lead.  From the defense’s perspective, the play runs time 
off the clock, while the extra defenders increase its chances of stopping the of-
fense on the play.  The defense does incur the cost of the five-yard penalty, but 
that is a minimal, virtually meaningless cost in this situation because the offense 
remains half a field from scoring the go-ahead touchdown and has much less 
time to do it.  The trailing team on offense experiences this as high costs, offset by 
a minimal, virtually meaningless benefit—the five yards do not help the offense 
much, given the loss of time and the long distance still to travel for the touch-
down.  Rulemakers could rationally view the cost-benefit balance as sufficiently 
disparate to justify a limiting rule, given the relative meaninglessness of the five 
yards and the importance of the expired seconds. 
Second, the defensive team is free to manipulate the play.  It makes the 
choice to place those extra players on the field, and doing so gives it an over-
whelming advantage in stopping the play by playing twelve or more players 
against eleven.  The offense can do nothing to counter this move except run its 
play, which is unlikely to succeed against the extra defenders. 
Third, the defense acts contrary to ordinary expectations in deliberately 
placing too many players on the field, knowing that doing so violates the rules 
and will result in a penalty.  Teams generally do not want to take penalties, which 
disadvantage them and benefit the opponent.  In this case, however, taking that 
penalty is the point.   
Finally, a defensive team with a lead has a strong incentive to do this when-
ever a similar situation arises, because the likely benefits of more easily stopping 
the play with the extra players and running significant seconds off the clock sub-
stantially outweigh the minimal costs of five yards with the ball still far from the 
end zone. 
A limiting rule thus is appropriate here to prevent, or at least disincentivize, 
the defense from intentionally placing too many players on the field in this game 
situation.  With the purported lesson of Super Bowl XLVI in mind, the NFL’s 
rulemakers did just that.  The new rule, which took effect in the 2012 season, cre-
ated a new too-many-players penalty.  If the defense has more than eleven players 
in its formation—meaning on the field and ready to be involved in the play—
when the snap is imminent, the referees immediately whistle the play dead and 
call the infraction, stopping the clock and assessing five yards against the defense.  
This removes any incentive to intentionally play too many defenders.  Because no 
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time runs off the clock, the defense incurs only the cost of losing five yards with-
out gaining the sought after benefit of lost time. 
The incentive for a defensive team with a lead to place extra players in for-
mation is not present in every late-game situation.  For example, it likely would 
not do this if it was ahead by only three points or fewer and a field goal could tie 
or win the game because the five-yard penalty would shorten the length of the 
field goal, making it a meaningful cost to the defense and meaningful benefit to 
the offense.  The defense also likely would not try this if more time remained on 
the clock.  Wasting eight seconds on a nonplay is not significant with two 
minutes remaining because the offense has more time and more plays to move 
the ball down the field.  Moreover, the defense likely would not try this if the ball 
is close to the end zone, in which case those five yards significantly increase the 
offense’s chances of scoring the winning touchdown. 
This arguably renders the new dead-ball penalty overinclusive.  The limit-
ing rule applies whenever the defense has too many players in the formation, even 
if the infraction is obviously not intentional because the game situation is one in 
which the defense has no real incentive to take the penalty.  But limiting rules, 
like most legislative rules, often are overinclusive, a byproduct of trying to regulate 
conduct with words.28  And overinclusiveness becomes problematic only if the 
rule prohibits instances of the targeted conduct that, on balance, are beneficial to 
the game.29  But there are no beneficial examples of the defense placing too many 
players in formation—no situations in which it would be a net positive within the 
game’s logic and structure for a team to have twelve players involved in a play—
that are lost by imposing a dead-ball penalty even if the defense does not act in-
tentionally.  To the extent the defense has no strategic incentive to intentionally 
take this foul in a particular game situation, the new dead-ball penalty offers a se-
cond disincentive against the defense ever doing it intentionally. 
Moreover, the original too-many-players penalty, which is not a dead-ball 
penalty and does not immediately stop the clock, remains on the books.  It con-
trols when the extra players on the field are not involved in the play when the ball 
is snapped, usually when they are trying to run off the field but have not reached 
the sideline.  While a penalty, this play remains live, with the clock stopping and 
the infraction called only after completion of the play.30  In cost-benefit terms, a 
dead-ball penalty is unnecessary here.  Because the extra player is not in the for-
mation and not involved in the play, the play itself remains eleven-on-eleven.  
  
28. Wasserman, supra note 1, at 513. 
29. Id. at 512–13. 
30. NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, OFFICIAL PLAYING RULES OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL 
LEAGUE Rule 5-1-1 (2013). 
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The defense gains no extraordinary benefit from having extra players to stop the 
play and the offense has the same chance of running a successful play against an 
equal number of defenders.  Absent that potential benefit, a defensive team 
would never intentionally commit this foul, so a limiting rule is not necessary as a 
deterrent. 
2. Conserving Time Through Penalties 
The flip side involves a trailing team without the ball seeking to preserve 
time through intentional penalties.  The goal is to stop the clock, extend the 
game, and force the offense to run additional plays, thereby giving the trailing 
team a chance to get the ball back and win the game.  One example—taken from 
a November 2013 regular season game—shows the welter of competing rules 
that respond to incentives and cost-benefit balances.  It also shows the different 
approaches rulemakers may take to closing gaps in the rules. 
With just over two minutes remaining in the second half, the New Orleans 
Saints led the Atlanta Falcons 17–13 and had possession of the ball.  The Saints 
gained eighteen yards and a first down on a play in which the Falcons committed 
defensive holding, a foul penalized by five yards and an automatic first down.  
The Saints declined the penalty and accepted the result of the play, which gave 
them more yards than would the penalty.  Had there been no foul, the clock 
would have continued to run.  But the penalty stopped the clock, which would 
not restart until the next snap, functionally giving the Falcons an additional 
timeout.  The  clock stoppage forced the Saints to run several additional plays, 
plays they might not have had to run had the clock not stopped on the penalty.  
The Falcons got the ball back with five seconds remaining,31 time that would 
have been gone had there been no penalty.32  
 
FIGURE 3.  
[Audio File] 
 
All four features are present in this game situation, making a limiting rule 
appropriate.  First, the play produced a significantly inequitable cost-benefit dis-
parity—the trailing defensive team stopped the clock when it otherwise could not 
  
31. 4th Quarter Play by Play, ESPN NFL, http://scores.espn.go.com/nfl/playbyplay?gameId= 
331121001&period=4 (last visited Jan. 6, 2014). 
32. SlateRadio, Hang up and Listen: The King of the (Chess) World Edition, SOUNDCLOUD, https:// 
soundcloud.com/slateradio/hang-up-and-listen-the-king-of (last visited Jan. 6, 2014).  The rele-
vant discussion begins at the 51:50 mark of the audio. 
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have without having to spend a timeout, forced the leading team to run addition-
al plays, and got the ball back with at least a few seconds remaining and a chance 
to win the game.  Second, the defense controlled the play because the offense 
could do nothing to prevent the foul or the clock from stopping.  Third, the trail-
ing team again acted contrary to the game’s ordinary rules, practices, and strate-
gies because teams ordinarily do not want to commit fouls or incur the costs of 
penalty yards.  Finally, the opportunity to preserve time might incentivize a trail-
ing defense to commit such fouls in similar situations. 
This play sits at the intersection of three rules.  The default rule is that when 
either team commits a foul, the clock restarts as if no foul had occurred.  Thus, if 
the clock would have kept running at the end of the play but for the foul, the 
clock restarts as soon as the ball is ready, but if the clock would have stopped even 
without the foul, the clock restarts on the next snap.33  But this default rule does 
not apply in the last two minutes of the first half or the last five minutes of the se-
cond half, when the clock instead always restarts on the next snap.34  This excep-
tion controlled in the Saints-Falcons because fewer than five minutes remained in 
the second half.  This is why the penalty functioned as a timeout for the Falcons—
although the clock ordinarily would not have stopped absent the foul, it did stop 
in the final five minutes.  Third, in the final minute of each half, teams are pro-
hibited from conserving time by committing certain acts, including intentional 
fouls that cause the clock to stop.35  The penalty for such an act is that ten seconds 
run off the clock and the clock restarts when the ball is ready. 
This third rule is a limiting rule.  It closes a potential hole in the rules by im-
posing the outcome that would have resulted on the play without the intentional 
penalty, thereby putting the teams in the same place as if the penalty had not 
occurred—the clock restarts and the ten second runoff puts the time about where 
it would have been had there been no penalty and the clock continued running.  
By imposing that outcome, the limiting rule eliminates the incentive for the trail-
ing team to intentionally commit penalties to stop the clock in the final minute. 
But our game demonstrates that the limiting rule does not go far enough.  It 
does not reach intentional fouls occurring with slightly more than one minute 
remaining in a half but late enough that the trailing team has the same incentives 
to conserve time.  The limiting rule also does not address unintentional fouls—as 
this play might have been—meaning a trailing team might gain these significant 
cost-benefit advantages, even if only accidentally. 
  
33. NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, OFFICIAL PLAYING RULES OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL 
LEAGUE Rule 4-3-2(f) (2013). 
34. Id. at Rules 4-3-2(f)(1), (2). 
35. Id. at Rule 4-7-1(f). 
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The solution is to extend the limiting rule in either of two ways.  One way is 
to extend when the limiting rule applies, perhaps to the final three minutes of 
each half, or at least of the second half.  By that point, a leading team is already in 
time-wasting mode and a trailing team in time-conserving mode, meaning the 
incentives to stop the clock by committing fouls remain.  The increasing sophisti-
cation with which NFL coaches understand and strategize these final 
minutes36—suggests trailing teams will try to conserve time earlier than the one-
minute mark. 
A better option is to eliminate the intermediate exception in Rule 4-3-
2(f)(2).  Instead, the default rule—if the clock would have continued running on 
the last play but for the penalty, the clock restarts when the ball is ready—controls 
throughout the game until the final minute of each half, at which point the en-
hanced sanction of Rule 4-7-1 takes over.  Teams thus never receive any time 
benefit even from an accidental penalty.  The limiting rule is needed only for the 
narrower function of disincentivizing intentional fouls just in the final minute by 
imposing the additional cost of the ten-second run-off.  This approach eliminates 
the current gap between the one minute mark when Rule 4-7-1 takes effect and 
the five minute mark when Rule 4-3-2(f)(2) take effect.  And it ensures that trail-
ing teams never gain substantial time benefits—the functional equivalent of a 
timeout—in the closing minutes by committing fouls, whether unintentionally or 
intentionally. 
B. Intentional Scores and Intentional Nonscores 
Football’s balance between points and time, and its effect on rules and strat-
egy, was on even more vivid display on the Giants’ final scoring drive of Super 
Bowl XLVI, which immediately preceded the Patriots’ final drive on which the 
Giants committed the too-many players penalty. 
With approximately one minute remaining in the game, the Patriots led 
17–15 and the Giants had the ball on the Patriots’ six-yard line.  The Giants were 
highly likely to score the go-ahead points, whether by touchdown37 or by a very 
short field goal.38  Recognizing this, the Patriots intentionally allowed the Giants 
  
36. Game situations and best strategies are regularly dissected on advanced metrics sites.  ADVANCED 
NFL STATS, http://www.advancednflstats.com (last visited Jan. 6, 2014). 
37. A team with a first down from the opponent’s six yard line has a 68 percent likelihood of scoring a 
touchdown on the drive.  Conor McGovern, A Closer Look at Touchdowns in the Red Zone, 
FOOTBALL OUTSIDERS, http://www.footballoutsiders.com/stat-analysis/2013/closer-look-touch 
downs-red-zone (last visited Jan. 6, 2014). 
38. Had the Giants gained no more yards, this would have been a 23-yard field goal.  During the 2012 
regular season, NFL kickers were 15/15 on field goals of 1–20 yards (meaning the ball was snapped 
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to score a touchdown on the next play, allowing the Giants running back to run 
untouched into the end zone.  The Patriots’ strategy was to allow the inevitable 
points quickly and get the ball back with more time left for its offense to move the 





This was not the first Super Bowl in which the defense allowed its opponent 
to score the winning points easily in order to maximize the amount of time re-
maining when it regained possession.  In Super Bowl XXXII, played in January 
1998, the game was tied 24–24 with less than two minutes remaining when the 
Denver Broncos had the ball on the Green Bay Packers’ one-yard line.  Similarly 
recognizing the near-certainty that the Broncos would score some points to take 
the lead, the Packers allowed the Broncos to score the go-ahead touchdown on 
the next play, thereby giving the Packers the ball back with more time on the 
clock.40 
The offensive team, knowing it is highly likely to score to take the lead, es-
pecially if a short field goal is enough to win the game, may thwart the defense’s 
strategy by intentionally trying to not score quickly.  The offense might run plays 
that will not score a touchdown or even advance the ball; the goal is simply to run 
time off the clock or force the defense to spend its limited timeouts before scoring 
those go-ahead points several plays, and seconds, later.  When the opposing team 
gets the ball, now trailing, it has less time and fewer timeouts, which together 
make a game-winning drive more difficult.41  Figure 4 shows that the Giants 
running back recognized that the defense was letting him score and tried to stop 
  
from the three-yard line or closer) and 231/239 on field goals of 20–29 yards (meaning the ball was 
snapped somewhere between the three and twelve yard lines).  Sortable Stats, YAHOO! SPORTS, 
http://sports.yahoo.com/nfl/stats/bycategory?cat=Kicking&conference=NFL&year=season_2012
&timeframe=All&sort=272&old_category=Kicking (last updated Jan. 5, 2014). 
39. ByZirtrix, Super Bowl XLVI Bradshaw Game Winning Touchdown! Giants v Patriots (21-17), 
YOUTUBE (Feb. 5, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pWtQm0FXWr0. 
40. Best Super Bowls of All-Time—Super Bowl XXXII—Green Bay Packers vrs. Denver Broncos, 
EVONSPORTS (Jan. 30, 2012), http://evonsports.wordpress.com/2012/01/30/best-super-bowls-
of-all-time-5-super-bowl-xxxii-green-bay-packers-vrs-denver-broncos (“Packers’ coach Mike 
Holmgren instructed his team to let the Broncos score to preserve as much time on the clock for 
Favre to drive down the field.”). 
41. Especially if the team now trails by more than three points—as in both of our games—in which 
case it must move the ball all the way down the field for a touchdown. 
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at the one-yard line, but his momentum carried him forward and he fell into the 
end zone. 
Two of the defining features that trigger a limiting rule are present here: 
Both teams are intentionally failing, or declining, to make the ordinarily expected 
athletic plays and both have strong incentives to intentionally fail or decline to do 
so.  The offense is intentionally not trying to score in an effort to run time off the 
clock, while the defense is intentionally allowing the offense to score in an effort 
to conserve time. 
But the mutuality of these efforts (or nonefforts) eliminates the need for a 
limiting rule.  This is not a one-sided situation in which one team acts contrary to 
expectations and the other is helpless to meaningfully respond.  Both teams influ-
ence this play, each attempting to manipulate the situation to its advantage, and 
those competing efforts cancel one another out.  And each team has the power to 
counter the other’s strategy.  Knowing the defense is going to allow it to score, the 
offense may run plays designed to use time but not score.  The defense can coun-
ter this move by pushing the offensive player into the end zone.  More important-
ly, the defense will have a chance, however difficult or unlikely, to stop the offense 
when it finally does attempt to score the go-ahead points.  Alternatively, the of-
fense can accept the quick-and-easy score to seize the lead and then rely on its 
defense to stop the opponent from scoring when it gets the ball back, even 
though more time remains on the clock.  In fact, the let-them-score strategy failed 
for the Packers in Super Bowl XXXII and the Patriots in Super Bowl XLVI.  In 
both games, the team given the uncontested late-game touchdown prevailed 
when its defense stopped the opponent from scoring on the next possession. 
This game situation entails a relatively equitable exchange of costs, benefits, 
and risks.  In allowing the offense to score, the now-trailing team risks being una-
ble to overcome those points, even with extra time.  In refusing to accept the score 
or in intentionally delaying scoring, the other team risks forgoing easy points and 
failing when it finally attempts to score.  Each team is trying to work the situation 
to its advantage based on some calculation of what gives it the best percentage 
chance to win.  This is not the overwhelmingly unbalanced cost-benefit exchange 
that demands a limiting rule as a corrective.42 
Objections to these competing strategies sound not in fairness or equity—
the concerns compelling most limiting rules43—but aesthetics.44  It looks and 
  
42. See Brian Burke, When to Intentionally Allow a TD When Tied, ADVANCED NFL STATS (Jan. 15, 
2013), http://www.advancednflstats.com/2013/01/when-to-intentionally-allow-td-when-tied.html. 
43. Wasserman, supra note 1, at 486, 493. 
44. Tim Keown, Unworthy End to Super Bowl XLVI, ESPN (Feb. 7, 2012), http://espn.go.com/ 
espn/commentary/story/_/page/keown-120207/ahmad-bradshaw-uncontested-touchdown-
288 61 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 272 (2014) 
 
feels contrary to the supposed ethos of sport.  The defense should not intentional-
ly allow the offense to score the winning touchdown in the Super Bowl.  An of-
fensive player, given the long-dreamed-of opportunity to score the winning 
touchdown in the Super Bowl, should not regret that he could not stop himself 
from crossing the goal line.  It is artistically unappealing to see a player, on the 
verge of scoring the championship-clinching points, trying to stop and scoring 
only because his weight and momentum caused him to flop backward into the 
end zone. 
Whether to accept these dueling strategies depends on how we understand 
what are expected actions in football.  This, in turn, depends on how we define 
the purpose of football and the competing goals of scoring points and running 
time off the clock.  If the latter goal is as important as the former, then these strat-
egies are ineluctably part of a team’s successful approach to the game—surrendering 
or forgoing points in favor of clock benefits is a sound and expected strategy that 
the rules should accommodate.  In fact, intentionally surrendering points or re-
fusing to accept easy points is a common strategy in the waning seconds of other 
sports governed by a clock.45  In any event, even if football rulemakers wanted to 
eliminate this strategy for aesthetic reasons, it is not clear how they could do so or 
what the resulting limiting rule might look like.  It would be impossible to en-
force a rule that requires officials to identify when the offense is not trying to score 
or when the defense is not trying to stop the offense from scoring. 
  
undignified-way-end-super-bowl-xlvi (“It was not a proud or particularly dignified way to decide 
the Super Bowl.”). 
45. Basketball presents some obvious examples.  A team trailing late in the game will intentionally foul 
to stop the clock and give the leading team a chance to increase its lead by making free throws.  The 
trailing team’s hope is that the player will miss one or both free throws and that it will get the ball 
back and score, eventually tying the game if this process happens enough times.  A different 
question, which has been a subject of statistical analysis, is whether a team leading by three points 
late in the game should intentionally foul, potentially giving up two points on the made free throws, 
but preventing the opponent from shooting a game-tying three-point shot.  See, e.g., John 
Ezekowitz, Up Three, Time Running out, Do We Foul? The First Comprehensive CBB Analysis, 
HARVARD SPORTS ANALYSIS COLLECTIVE (Aug. 24, 2010), http://harvardsportsanalysis. 
wordpress.com/2010/08/24/intentionally-fouling-up-3-points-the-first-comprehensive-cbb-
analysis; Ken Pomeroy, Yet Another Study About Fouling When up 3, KENPOM.COM (Feb. 12, 
2013), http://kenpom.com/blog/index.php/weblog/entry/yet_another_study_about_fouling_ 
when_up_3.  On the other hand, knowing that it needs three points to tie the game, the shooting 
team might intentionally miss the second free throw, hoping to get the rebound and score the tying 
basket.  See Varun Iyengar, Men’s Basketball Wins 3OT Thriller at Midd., AMHERST STUDENT 
(Feb. 19, 2013, 11:06 PM), http://amherststudent.amherst.edu/?q=article/2013/02/19/men% 
E2%80%99s-basketball-wins-3ot-thriller-midd.   
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C. Intentional Safety 
In Super Bowl XLVII, played in February 2013, the Baltimore Ravens led 
the San Francisco 49ers 33–29 with eleven seconds remaining.  They had the ball 
on fourth down at their own eight-yard line and were about to punt the ball away. 
But a punt in this situation is risky, as the punter would be standing at the 
back of the end zone and facing pressure from rushing defenders.  Several bad 
outcomes are possible here: (1) a blocked punt or fumbled snap recovered by the 
49ers for a go-ahead touchdown; (2) a poor punt under pressure returned for the 
go-ahead touchdown; (3) a poor punt under pressure giving the 49ers the ball 
with only a short distance to travel for the winning touchdown.  An average pro-
fessional punt travels approximately forty-six yards from the line of scrimmage,46 
although the heavy rush in this situation made it unlikely to be an average punt.  
The best-case scenario for the Ravens would have given the 49ers the ball around 
midfield, with time enough for them to attempt one or two deep throws to the 
end zone.  Another possibility was a blocked punt or fumbled snap that the Ra-
vens recovered or that traveled out of bounds in the end zone, resulting in a safety 
and two points for the 49ers. 
Faced with these options, the Ravens chose to take that safety intentionally.  
The punter took the snap and ran around the back of the end zone with the ball 
for eight seconds before stepping out of bounds.47 
 
FIGURE 5.  
[Video File] 
 
The Ravens willingly gave up two points, making the score 33–31.  And 
they still had to kick the ball back to the 49ers, just as before the safety.  But the 
kick was now done as a safety kick, a free kick following a safety;48 the Ravens 
would kick from the twenty yard line rather than the end zone, with no rush and 
no risk of a bad snap or block.  This safety kick traveled sixty-one yards in the air, 
far longer than the average punt under pressure; was fielded around the 49ers’ 
twenty yard line; and was returned only to midfield as time expired.  Even if time 
  
46. Sortable Stats, YAHOO! SPORTS, http://sports.yahoo.com/nfl/stats/bycategory?cat=Punting& 
conference=NFL&year=season_2012&timeframe=All&qualified=1&sort=411&old_category=Pu
nting (last updated Jan. 5, 2014). 
47. Stanley Shipley, Super Bowl—Where’s the Holding Penalty?, YOUTUBE (Feb. 4, 2013), http:// 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=5-C8NZU-EqI. 
48. NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, OFFICIAL PLAYING RULES OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL 
LEAGUE Rule 6-1-1(b) (2013). 
290 61 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 272 (2014) 
 
had not expired on the free kick, the 49ers would have had time to run only one 
more play from scrimmage, likely from worse field position than if the ball had 
been punted from the end zone. 
At first glance, this situation might appear to warrant a limiting rule.  With-
out question, the Ravens intentionally acted contrary to football expectations and 
strategies.  The punter made no effort to perform his ordinary and expected 
skill—punting—but instead held the ball for several seconds before intentionally 
stepping out of bounds in his own end zone and surrendering two points.  And 
this was the plan; the Ravens made no effort to do anything else.  Further, the 
game situation produced high benefits for the Ravens and imposed high burdens 
on the 49ers, in turn incentivizing the Ravens to make this move.  On fourth 
down in the waning seconds of a four-point game when the leading team already 
must punt ball away, the two points are not a significant cost to it or a significant 
benefit to the trailing team.  By contrast, running eight seconds off the clock and 
being able to kick without pressure from the twenty yard line with just three se-
conds remaining both strongly benefit the leading team and disadvantage the trail-
ing team.  One might see this cost-benefit exchange as too imbalanced, as the 
trailing team loses badly on the exchange. 
What is missing here is disparity in control over the play, because both 
teams had a change to influence the play and to counter the opposing team’s 
moves.  The 49ers could have limited the time that elapsed—lessening the cost 
incurred—by tackling the punter or making him run out of bounds sooner.  
Seemingly unprepared for the Ravens’ move, they allowed 75 percent of the re-
maining time to run off the clock.  Had they reached the punter more quickly, 
they might have regained possession with more time remaining. 
More importantly, the 49ers had several ways to take advantage of the safety 
once they regained possession, now trailing by two points and needing only a 
field goal to win the game.  First, they could have returned the free kick for a 
touchdown.  Second, the returner could have called for a fair catch on the free 
kick, leaving the 49ers time to attempt a game-winning play from scrimmage, al-
beit from distance and with only time to run one play.49  Third, and most intri-
guing for scholars of obscure rules, the returner could have called for a fair catch 
to set up a fair-catch kick.  This is a field goal attempt, which would have won the 
game, from the spot of the fair catch, attempted with no rush on the kick.50  This 
is a vestigial rule, a throwback to the rugby elements of early football and the “goal 
  
49. Again, they could have given themselves more time, perhaps enough to run two plays, had they not 
allowed so much time to lapse on the safety. 
50. NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, OFFICIAL PLAYING RULES OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL 
LEAGUE Rules 10-2-4(a), 11-4-3 (2013). 
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from mark.”51  Although this likely was not an option given how far the Ravens’ 
free kick traveled, it might have been possible on a shorter free kick.  An NFL 
kicker can make a field goal from approximately seventy-five yards away—
meaning the ball is kicked from the opposite thirty-five yard line—when not un-
der pressure, particularly indoors.   
In any event, it is enough that football’s rules provide meaningful, even if 
improbable, opportunities to counter the intentional safety.  So long as the basic 
rules and strategies allow a team to do something in response to an unexpected 
play, there is no need for the protections of a limiting rule.  Certainly the oppor-
tunities available to a team in the 49ers’ situation are more realistic than the Patri-
ots trying to run a successful play against twelve or thirteen defenders.  Each of 
these options is less favorable to the 49ers than a blocked punt or a chance to re-
turn a live punt kicked under pressure from the back of the end zone.  But that is 
why the Ravens willingly took the safety.  It provided benefits—in terms of field 
position for the free kick and the lapsed time—with fewer risks, while imposing 
costs on the opponent.  But a limiting rule is not appropriate so long as the disad-
vantaged team retains some opportunities to counter a strategy and avoid that 
cost-benefit imbalance, even if those options all are suboptimal.   
Of course, it appears from Figure 5 that the 49ers took so long to reach the 
punter on the safety, and the Ravens were able to run so much time off the clock, 
in part because the Ravens’ offensive line committed multiple illegal holds, none 
of which were called.  The Ravens thus prevented the 49ers from countering their 
strategy on the safety in a way that violated football’s rules.  Offensive holding in 
the end zone results in a safety,52 so the outcome on the play—two points for the 
49ers followed by a Ravens safety kick—would have been the same had those 
holds been called.  But holding is a live-ball foul, meaning play continues and the 
clock runs until the play is over.53  Thus, even had those holds been called, the 
eight seconds would have lapsed on the nonplay.  A leading team in this situation 
thus has incentive to act contrary to the game’s expectations in a second way—not 
only to intentionally take the safety by running out of the end zone but also to in-
tentionally commit fouls as a way to prolong the play for as long as possible. 
This additional element arguably renders the cost-benefit exchange inequi-
table and imbalanced, as the trailing team cannot reasonably be expected to counter 
  
51. Barry Petchesky, The Rarest Play in the NFL, SLATE (Feb. 4, 2013, 5:00 PM), http://www. 
slate.com/articles/sports/sports_nut/2013/02/fair_catch_kick_we_came_tantalizingly_close_to_se
eing_the_rarest_play_in.html (internal quotation marks omitted). 
52. NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, OFFICIAL PLAYING RULES OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL 
LEAGUE Rule 11-5-1 (2013). 
53. Id. at Rules 4-4(e), 12-1-3(c). 
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illegal plays.  Rulemakers thus might consider a partial limiting rule by eliminat-
ing intentional fouls that expend extra time on the intentional safety.  One possi-
bility is to make holding in the end zone a dead-ball penalty, meaning that once 
the official identifies the hold, the whistle blows the play dead and stops the 
clock.  This eliminates the incentive to commit the holding foul on top of the in-
tentional safety.  The leading team incurs the two-point cost of the safety without 
receiving the additional benefit of more time running off the clock.  It also levels 
the cost-benefit balance somewhat, by preventing the leading team from unlaw-
fully running additional time in the course of surrendering the safety.  But this 
may not be a feasible or safe solution.54  It is difficult to stop the action midplay, 
as opposed to at or immediately after the snap, because players may not hear the 
whistle and may be moving too quickly to stop. 
A more workable and safe limiting rule might restore the clock to the point 
at which the holding foul occurred.  Based on the video of Super Bowl XLVII in 
Figure 5, this rule would have restored the clock to about ten seconds, when the 
first obvious hold occurred, meaning only one second would have lapsed on the 
safety and the 49ers might have had more time to do something following the free 
kick.  This rule again eliminates any incentive to commit intentional holds by 
removing the additional timing benefit to the leading team and the additional 
timing cost on the trailing team. 
One also might complain about cost-benefit imbalance if time expires on 
the safety itself while the leading team is running around the end zone—if, for 
example, there were only three seconds remaining at the beginning of the play.  
But existing rules address this potential disparity.  If a safety occurs at the end of a 
half, the receiving team—the team that just scored two points—may elect to re-
ceive the free kick.55  A team trailing at the end of regulation obviously will do so.  
Further, if time expires on a free kick on which a fair catch is called, the team can 
extend time with a fair-catch kick, although not with another play from scrim-
mage.56  In other words, following the safety, the trailing team will have a chance 
to receive the safety kick and try to either return it for a touchdown or attempt a 
fair-catch kick, even after time has expired.  We might, however, question leaving 
the trailing team with only two options rather than three merely because time 
happened to expire on the safety.  Rulemakers thus might restore a third option 
on an end-of-second-half, no-time-remaining safety—fair catch and one play 
from scrimmage—to further equalize the cost-benefit exchange. 
  
54. See Wasserman, supra note 1, at 514–15. 
55. NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, OFFICIAL PLAYING RULES OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL 
LEAGUE Rule 4-8-2(h) (2013). 
56. Id. at Rule 10-2-5(a). 
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D. Sideline Interference 
The potential for unexpected strategy in Super Bowl XLVII between the 
Ravens and 49ers did not end with the intentional safety.  As teams set up for 
the subsequent safety kick, the Ravens’ quarterback, Joe Flacco, was recorded on 
the sideline talking with teammates about running onto the field and tackling 
the 49ers returner if he broke free on the return and was about to score a touch-
down.57 
Flacco was threatening to repeat one of the most infamous plays in college 
football history.  In the 1954 Cotton Bowl between the University of Alabama 
and Rice University, Alabama’s Tommy Lewis jumped off the bench to tackle 
Rice’s Dicky Moegle, who had broken a long run along the sideline.58 
 
FIGURE 6.  
[Video File] 
 
This game situation unquestionably demands a limiting rule because all four 
defining features are present.  First, by jumping off the bench and interfering 
with an ongoing play, Flacco would intentionally be doing something entirely 
contrary to football’s ordinary expectations, rules, and practices.  Second, there is 
nothing the trailing team can do to prevent him from doing this—no way to stop 
him from running off the bench and no way to counter the interference.  Third, 
the benefits to be gained—stopping a certain, Super Bowl–winning touch-
down—are obvious and overwhelming and clearly incentivize attempting this 
move.  The game would not end on this foul,59 so the 49ers would get a chance to 
run an untimed play from scrimmage or kick the winning field goal following the 
penalty.  Nevertheless, the cost-benefit exchange is heavily imbalanced.  A player 
in Flacco’s position would much rather halt a certain score and take a chance that 
his defense could stop one play from scrimmage or that the opponent would miss 
the field goal attempt.  Having an opportunity to defend a new play, even if un-
successful, is better than watching a certain touchdown that clinches the Super 
  
57. ‘Sound FX’: Baltimore Ravens Win Super Bowl XLVII, NFL (Feb. 6, 2013, 9:35 PM), 
http://www.nfl.com/videos/nfl-films-sound-efx/0ap2000000136915/Sound-FX-Ravens-win-
Super-Bowl-XLVII.  Flacco can be heard from the 3:55–4:14 mark in the video. 
58. Ronstinetx, 1954 Cotton Bowl: Dicky Maegle—Tommy Lewis Tackle Play, YOUTUBE (Jan. 1, 2008), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=eSteCSinjTs; see also Dick Heller, 
Refs Didn’t Cotton to Off-Bench Stop, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2007, available at http://www. 
ricefootball.net/collegeinnwtstory.htm. 
59. NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, OFFICIAL PLAYING RULES OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL 
LEAGUE Rule 4-8-2(a) (2013). 
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Bowl.  Similarly, the costs to the 49ers of losing a certain, game-winning score are 
much greater than the benefits of an opportunity to attempt a game-winning play 
against the defense. 
Fortunately, the NFL has a limiting rule for such a situation.  A player or 
anyone else on the bench may not “interfere with play by any act which is palpa-
bly unfair.”60  The rule grants the referee discretion, after consulting with the oth-
er officials, to award a score rather than the ordinary distance penalty.61  In other 
words, had this play developed and Flacco done as he was threatening, the offi-
cials would have awarded the 49ers the game-winning touchdown that would 
have happened anyway.  The officials similarly awarded a touchdown for the off-
the-bench tackle in the 1954 Cotton Bowl. 
This is precisely how a limiting rule should function.  It imposes the out-
come—a game winning touchdown—that would have resulted had Flacco not 
acted contrary to the game’s ordinary expectations, rules, ethics, and strategies by 
interfering with the play.  And by imposing that outcome, the rule eliminates any 
incentive for him to do this.  A player has no reason to interfere with the return if 
the touchdown will be awarded in any event.  Of course, awarding the touch-
down is discretionary—the official “may aware a score”—so the incentive is not 
eliminated entirely.  Flacco recognized this, stating that the worst that could hap-
pen was that officials award the touchdown anyway.  But if there is even a remote 
possibility that they would not, it might be worth the risk.  The effectiveness of 
limiting rules in eliminating negative incentives thus depends not only on the 
rulemakers who draft the rules but also on the game officials who apply and en-
force them. 
Sideline interference returned to the public conversation during the 2013 
regular season, ironically with the Ravens on the opposite side of the play.  Dur-
ing a game between the Ravens and Pittsburgh Steelers on Thanksgiving night, a 
Ravens player lost a potential touchdown when the Steelers’ head coach—who, 
also ironically, is a member of the Competition Committee—appeared to step 
onto the field in front of the Ravens’ player as he ran along the sideline.  This 
caused the player to break stride and change direction to avoid a collision, allow-
ing him to be tackled from behind.  Sports commentary immediately returned to 
Flacco’s plans for the final play of the Super Bowl nine months earlier.62 
 
  
60. Id. at Rule 12-3-3. 
61. Id. 
62. See, e.g., Mike Tomlin Intentionally Interfered, Flacco Says, CBC SPORTS (Nov. 29, 2013, 1:01 PM), 
http://www.cbc.ca/sports/football/nfl/mike-tomlin-intentionally-interfered-flacco-says-1.2445288. 
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FIGURE 7.  
 
 
No penalty was called on the play, likely because the officials did not see the 
interference.  But the NFL reviewed the play after the game and fined the coach 
$100,000, while also leaving open the possibility of stripping the team of a pick in 
the next draft.63  Such league-imposed postgame individual sanctions provide 
additional deterrence against sideline interference and similar intentional unfair 
acts.  A player should be less willing to consider leaving the bench to tackle the 
breakaway runner if the game-winning touchdown will be awarded anyway and 
he will be fined a substantial sum of money or suspended once the game ends.  
These supplementary individual penalties also deter a player from gambling on 
how the referee will exercise his discretion on the play, even on the final play of 
the Super Bowl. 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay is not intended as a comprehensive catalogue of football game 
situations and limiting rules.  Rather, it shows with a few examples that football 
contains plays involving varied cost-benefit balances, as well as limiting rules de-
  
63. Alan Robinson, Steelers Coach Tomlin Fined $100k by NFL, TRIBLIVE (Dec. 4, 2013, 11:30 AM), 
http://triblive.com/sports/steelers/5192070-74/tomlin-draft-steelers#axzz2mQHFQxKr. 
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signed and functioning much like the infield fly rule.  What is missing is the same 
fascination that academics have long had with baseball.  Perhaps it is time for 
scholars to turn our eyes to the football rulebook. 
